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ABSTRACT
The  effects  of  environment  on  trade  and  welfare  are  analyzed  in  a  modified
Heckscher-Ohlin  framework  using  a quasi-homothetic  preferences  to account for  differences in
countries'  expenditure  shares  on  health.  Three  types of pollution,  local-disembodied,  global-
disembodied  and embodied,  result as a by-product of inputs used in production.  For each  case,
the  Walrasian,  Pareto  optimal  and  the  Regulators'  problem  are  analyzed.  The  optimal  tax  is
shown to improve each country's  welfare if the country is small in the world market.  Otherwise,
changes  in the terms of trade may cause one  country to be made better off at the expense of the
other.  Interdependence for the global-disembodied  case is explored  using a one-shot Nash game.
For the embodied pollution,  taxing the polluting input only  can cause  a decline in welfare  when
the polluting input is intensively  used.  Instead,  a tax on the polluting  input in  combination  with
a  subsidy  to the  non-polluting  input  is optimal.  In  general,  the  results  suggest  compensatory
payments  may  be required  to encourage  abatement  policies.  Contrary  to other  approaches,  an
abatement  policy  does not necessarily  decrease  a country's  comparative  advantage,  i.e.,  reduce
exports of the polluting  sector.
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Project.ENVIRONMENT,  WELFARE  AND GAINS  FROM  TRADE:
A NORTH-SOUTH  MODEL  IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
Environmental  effects  on welfare  and the gains  from North-South  trade  are modeled  by
adapting  the  traditional  Heckscher-Ohlin  framework  to  account  for environmental  externalities
in  production  and  their  impact  on  consumption  through  health.  As  incomes  grow,  a greater
proportion of income is spent on health including expenditures to mitigate environmental  effects.
Expenditures  on health range from a high of 12%  of GNP in the US to  an average of about 4%
in developing countries (World Bank, 1993,  p.4)2. Consequently, health has become an important
impetus for environmental  protection  in wealthy countries, a cause of trade disputes as illustrated
by  the  EC  ban  on  beef imports  treated  with  growth  hormones,  and  of particular  concern  in
developing countries (World Bank,  1993).  Agricultural  pollutants that enter the food chain have
received considerable attention in the US (Caswell,  1991).  US epidemiological  evidence suggests
that 2-3  percent of all  cancers  associated  with environmental  pollution occurs from  exposure to
pesticide  residues  on food  stuffs  which  allegedly  presents  a  greater  risk than hazardous  waste.
Emissions of particulate are  alone suspected of causing 20,000 to 30,000 premature deaths each
year in the US (Chivian,  1993).  It is also well known that high levels of morbidity and shortened
life expectancies  in  developing  countries have direct  environmental  linkages.  The World Bank
(1992)  presents  persuasive  evidence  that  unsafe  water,  inadequate  sanitation,  and  suspended
2  Based on data from  25 countries, Gertler and van der Gaag (1990)  estimate that health care expenditures rise
by about  1.32  percent for every  one percent increase  in  a country's  GNP.
2particulate  matter  are particularly  deleterious to  health in  these  countries3.
As  rich  countries  tend  to  be  more  willing  to  pursue  policies  that  alleviate  negative
environmental  impacts than poor countries, concern has been expressed about the possible effects
of these policies  on trade  and  comparative  advantage.  The  conflicts  and potential  for  conflict
between trade  and environmental  policies, especially  the effects of environmental  protection  on
trade patterns  and  gains from  trade4 have also become  a North-South issue.  Most of the trade
based models tend to predict that more stringent abatement  policies  negatively  affect  countries'
comparative advantage, thus inducing pollution intensive industries to migrate to the South where
environmental  standards are more lax.  Pethig (1976)  and Siebert (1979)  were among the first to
focus on pollution's effect on productivity in a trade context.  After accounting for the externality,
comparative  advantage is found to lie with the country whose  shadow price for pollution  is low
relative to the other country.  By a continuum  good model, Copeland and Taylor (1994)  find that
the higher income country  tends to  choose stronger environmental  protection, and  specializes in
relatively  clean  goods.  If differences  in  pollution  taxes  are  the  only  motive  for trade, then  a
movement  from  autarky  to free trade increases  aggregate  world pollution.  Other  contributions
focusing on the resource productivity  effects are those of McGuire  (1982),  and Merrifield (1989).
The former  used a Heckscher-Ohlin  framework  to obtain more general results than the previous
studies,  while  the  latter  considered  international  capital  mobility  and  the  likelihood  of
specialization  and  the  closing  of  polluting  industries  among  countries  in  the  presence  of
3 From a  1989 survey of 17,920 households in Brazil, Kassouf (1993)  finds water, sewers, electricity and paved
streets  to be strongly  associated with weight to height measures for children under six year of age.
4 See Patrick  Low (1992)  for  a review of this literature.externalities.  Chichilinisky  (1993)  studies in  an innovative  way the effect of property  rights on
comparative advantage in the presence of a potentially  exhaustible resource and obtains a similar
result,  namely,  the  region  in  which  property  rights  for  the  environmental  resource  are  poorly
defined  tend to export  environmentally  intensive  goods
The models  upon  which these results are  based suffer  a number of shortcomings.  First,
they tend  to ignore  the North-South  health-pollution-trade  linkages.  Pethig (1976)  was among
the  few  to  consider  environmental  impacts  on  utility  directly,  although  he  only  entered  an
environmental  variable  into  a  utility  function  of Leontief  form  without  discerning  whether  its
impact  was on health,  amenities  or  some other factor.  Chichilinisky  and Heal  (1992)  focus  on
differences  in  willingness  to  pay  for  carbon  emission  abatement  among  wealthy  and  poor
countries.  Each country's aggregate utility  function depends on the quality of the atmosphere  (a
global public  good), and  a composite private good.  The private good can  be transformed  into
the public  good  through  an  abatement  technology.  The marginal  costs of pollution  abatement
across countries  is found  to be  equal  only if countries' marginal  valuations of the private  good
are equal.  With diminishing returns to abatement, richer countries should push abatement further
as they have a lower marginal  valuation  of the private good.  However,  a single  composite good
and  no  production  precludes  insights  into  production  - emission  linkages  and  term  of trade
effects.
Second, the typical approach to modeling an externality  is to treat it proportional to output
(Siebert (1979)  and Kohn (1991)),  or to be an input into the production  process (Pethig (1976),
McGuire  (1982),  Merrifield  (1988)  and  Copeland  (1994)).  However,  inputs  used  in  the
production  process  typically yield a pollution by-product,  which is not necessarily  proportionalto  output, nor  is pollution  typically  an  input per  se.  Moreover,  some  forms of pollution  affect
health through consumption of market goods.  The health effects through consumption have direct
trade implications  if the pollution  is embodied in  the good.  Further, pollution  as  a by-product
of inputs  used  in  production  will  have  different  effects if pollution  remains within  the country
compared  to  the  case  where  it  is  transnational  in  nature.  In  both  the  case of embodied and
disembodied pollution,  the direct effect  of Pigouvian  taxes  on welfare  can be  undone  when the
terms  of trade  between  North  and  South  are  permitted  to  adjust,  suggesting  the  need  for
compensatory  payments.
The approach  developed  here  addresses  these  shortcomings.  To  emphasize  the  North-
South health-pollution-trade  linkages,  identical  but non-homothetic  preferences  are  assumed  so
that the richer North consumes higher levels of health than the South.  Three types of pollution
are modeled, local-disembodied,  global-disembodied  and embodied pollution, in a single analytical
framework which treats pollution as a by-product of an input employed in the production process.
The Walrasian equilibrium, the Pareto optimal policy, and the Regulators' problem are considered
for each  type of pollution.  For the embodied case we find the first best policy  instrument is not
only  a tax on  the polluting  input, but also  a subsidy  on the non-polluting  input if the polluting
input is intensively  used.  We analyze  the effects of pollution  abating instruments on trade  and
welfare  for  both  the  small  and  large  country  assumptions.  We find  that  an  pollution  control
policy  does  not  necessarily  have  an  adverse  effect  on  the  country's  comparative  advantage.
Hence, a country's comparative advantage in trade is still determined  by factor proportion theory
(the Heckscher-Ohlin  theorem).  Further, the direct effect of Pigouvian taxes on welfare  can  be
undone  when the terms of trade between North and  South are permitted to adjust, suggesting theneed  for  compensatory  payments.
The  basic model  and  the  Walrasian  equilibrium  are  laid  out in  Section  I.  The  Pareto
optimal  solution  to  each  of the  local,  global  and  embodied  cases  are  analyzed  in  Section  II.
Section  III  focuses  on  the Regulator's  problem  and  a number of propositions  for each of these
three  cases.  In  Section  IV we develop  numerical  examples  of each  case  to  further  clarify  the
conceptual model and its implications.  The numerical  examples  also serve to illustrate the nature
of a number of analytical  predictions that are indeterminate,  and the Nash  game that emerges for
the  Regulator's  problem.  The paper  thus  lays  the  ground  work  for  the  possible  next  step  of
constructing  a North - South applied general  equilibrium  model calibrated  to world  data.
I. The Basic  Model
There are two open economies,  North and  South.  Each employs  labor, L, and capital,  K,
to produce  two  tradable  goods X  and  Y.  The  technologies  are constant  returns  to  scale  and
identical across  countries.  The inputs are mobile between  sectors in each country,  but immobile
across countries.  The North is assumed to  be wealthier  than the South by being endowed  with
more capital  and equal  amounts of labor.  The key departures  from  the Heckscher-Ohlin  2x2x2
model  are the assumptions: (1) Pollution  is a by-product of input K employed in the production
of X;  (2)  Two  countries  have  identical  but non-homothetic  preferences  over  goods X, Y  and
health.  The first assumption  is based on the  observation  that most pollutants  are  produced  by
inputs, and the same input used in different industries can release different amounts of pollutants.
The health  effects of pollution are either  through  the environmental  degradation  which  we  call
disembodied effects  or  through  the  consumption  of  a  good  within  which  contaminants  are
embodied,  which  we  call embodied effects.  The second  assumption  captures the phenomenonthat demand  for health increases  in greater proportion to an increase  in  income.  Our results are
also  sensitive to  the assumption  that the production of X is capital  intensive.
The  production,  pollution,  health and  utility  functions  are  specified  as  follows.
1. Production Technologies
X  = F(Lx', KI)
yi = G(L', Kyi),
where  L,',  Kj'  denote  inputs  allocated  to the production  of the j-th commodity, j = X,  Y,  in the
i-th country, i = n  (North), s (South).  Technology  is assumed to be strictly increasing,  concave,
continuously  differentiable  and homogeneous  of degree  one  in arguments.
2. Pollution
The  effect  of pollution  on  the  environment  can  take one  of two forms,  embodied and
disembodied.  Embodied  pollution  affects  utility  through  the  consumption  of X  which,  as  we
show below,  maps into utility.  Examples  are  organic  and inorganic impurities  in food tissues,
such  as  bacteria  and  bacteriological  toxins,  pesticides,  herbicides  and  heavy  metal  deposits.
Disembodied pollution is not attached or bound to the individual good demanded.  Disembodied
pollution can  be local  (country  specific) or global  (world-wide)  such  as air pollution caused  by
suspended  particulate  matter,  ozone  depletion,  toxic  gases  from  manufacturing  plants,  and
diseases  caused by  airborne bacteria resulting  from plant or municipal  wastes.  We  analyze the
welfare  implications of each of these types of pollution  separately.
Disembodied  pollution, PO', in the i-th country is assumed to be generated as a by-product
from the employment of input Kx in  the production  X:
PO' = f(K').f(.)  is  assumed  to  be  identical  across  countries,  differentiable  and  strictly  increasing  in  Kx'.
Local-disembodied pollution's  effect on  environmental  degradation  is expressed  as  a departure
from  some  uniform  environmental  standard  E*:
Ei  = E*  - PO ,
Global-disembodied  pollution  is simply  the effects of both countries:
E  = E* - (PO  + PO').  (1.0)
Embodied pollution  is expressed  as  the concentration,  po  =  PO/X', in  parts  per  unit of
X produced.  Since F(-)  is homogeneous  of degree  one,  the concentration  of pollutants,  po',  is
scale  neutral,  which  implies  homogeneity  of degree  zero  in  (Lx,K,).  Hence,  the  pollution
concentration  function is expressed  as:
po0  =  g (Kx'/Lx),  (2.0)
where g(.)  is identical  across countries and strictly  increasing in  Kx'/L'.  Consequently,  the level
of embodied pollution  is  determined  by  relative  input  levels,  not  their  absolute  levels.  Since
pollution po'  is embodied in a tradable  good, pollution  consumed in a country is not necessarily
equal  to the amount produced.  For the X-exporting  country, the purity of X  consumed is equal
to the purity  of the X  it produces, i.e.,
E  =  1 - po', such  that  0 < po'  <  1.
For the X-importing country,  the level of pollution  consumed is a weighted average of domestic
and foreign  production  in the country's  consumption,  i.e.,
E, =  (1 - po')y  + (1 + po")(l  - y),
where y  =  XI,/X,,  the consumed  X  in the i-th country  over produced X  in  the South.
3. Utility
8Several considerations  affect the specification  of utility.  The specification  should permit
identical  preferences  among  agents  in  the  North  and  South,  it  should  be  consistent  with  the
observation  that the North  consumes  higher levels of health relative  to other normal goods  than
the  South,  and  it should avoid problems  of aggregation.  These  considerations  are  most  easily
handled by  specifying  a quasi-homothetic  form of utility (e.g.  Gorman polar, Gorman (1953),  or
a Stone-Geary  form).  Arguments of the identical  utility  function  are goods X,  Y and health, H:
U  U(Xi,Y,,Hj),  i = n,  s.  (3.0)
Health  is produced  by  goods  and environmental  quality
Hi  = h(X,,YY,  E),  (3.1)
where  E  =  {E',E,E,)  depending  on  the  case  being  analyzed.  This  function  is  assumed  to  be
identical  across  countries,  differentiable,  strictly  increasing  in (X,,Y,,E)  and concave  in (X,Yi).
Hence, environmental  degradation  affects  health and  utility  negatively.
From  this structure,  the indirect  utility
V(P,,Py,GNP,E)  = max,,)  {  U(X,,Y,h(X,,Y,,  E))  I PX, + PyY, = GNP,}  (4.0)
follow, where gross national  product  is:
GNP  = PxX'  +  PY'.
Further,  we assume health is relatively  more responsive to Y than X, i.e.,  1an(H)/•1n(Y)
>  aln(H)/aIn(X),  so  that 9(Y/X)/8GNP  >  0 holds'.  However,  the  signs  of 8X/oE  and  8Y/8E
require  even  more restrictions  functional  forms.
An example of a Stone-Geary  form for the disembodied  case  is U = axln(X-a1) + olan(Y-a 2) + (I-x,- o2)ln(H),
where  ln(H) = bln(X-a 1 ) + (1-  b)ln(Y-a,)  + cln(E).  The Marshallian  demand functions are:  X = a,  + (B/PxXGNP-
alP,-aP,),  Y  =  a2  +  [(l-B)/PJ(GNP-aP,-a 2 Py),  where  B  =-ai +  (l-x,- oa)b.  Then,  9(H/X)/8GNP  >  0  and
9(H/Y)/aGNP  > 0.  Furthermore,  if b < 0.5,  a,  > a2, and either  4 >_  a, or  l-a-o 2 > 0.5,  then 8(Y/X)/rGNP  > 0.4.  Competitive  Equilibrium with Pollution
The  equilibrium  levels of commodity supplies  and factor prices for this Heckscher-Ohlin
2x2x2  model can be derived following any one of a number traditional  methods (e.g.,  Woodland,
1982).  Given that the North  is endowed with  more K than the  South,  and the production  of X
is  capital  intensive,  equilibrium  within  country's  cone  of diversification  implies  the  levels  of
production:  X"  >  XV  and  Y"  <  Y5. Given  the  assumed  restrictions  on  preferences,  the
consumption  levels and ratios
X,  > X,  ,  Y,/X,  > Y,/X,  (5.0)
are  implied.  Thus, the North's  (South's) trade pattern  is to export  (import) good X for which  it
has  an excess supply  (demand),  and import (export)  good Y for which it has an excess demand
(supply).  At equilibrium,  world excess  demand  and supply  are  zero.
For local-disembodied  pollution,  the levels produced  and consumed in the North  exceed
those in the South,  i.e., PO" > PO'. Hence the environment is more degradated in the North than
the  South, E" < Es.  For global-disembodied  pollution,  PO" > PO" remains, however, from  (1.0),
both  countries  face the same  level  of environmental  degradation  E.  Since  factor prices,  w and
r for  L and  K, respectively,  equilibrate,  equation  (2.0)  implies  that pollution  concentration  per
unit of X produced  are  equal,  i.e.,  po" = po'.
H. Optimal Analysis  with  Three Types  of Pollution
Since the externality  affects  consumer's utility,  the competitive  equilibrium  is not Pareto
optimal.  By  comparing  the  necessary  conditions  for  Pareto  optimality  with  those  for  a
competitive equilibrium, we are able to identify first best policy instruments and correctly specify
the Regulator's  problem for each of the three cases, local-disembodied,  global-disembodied,  and
10embodied.
1. Optimal Analysis  for the  Case of Local-Disembodied  Pollution
A  Pareto  optimal  solution  can  be  derived  by  maximizing  one  country's  social  welfare
function  subject to  its endowments  and  a constraint  which  requires  that the  level  of the  other
country's  welfare  be  at  least  equal  to  the  level  derived  in  the  competitive  equilibrium.  The
problem  is:
Max (X) U(X,,Y.,h(X,,Y.,E  - PO"))
X =  {X,Y,L,K,PO  E  R+ 4  Us  = U(X,,Y,,h(X,,Y,,E* - PO')),
Xn + X,  =  F(Lx ",  Kx")  + F(Lx,  KxS)
Y.  + Y, = G(L,,  Ky")  +  G(Ly,,  Ky')
PO'  = f(KY')
L'  + L'  = L
K  +  Ky  K  ,  i=n,s  }.
ing  an  interior  solution  and  rearranging  the  first  order  conditions,  we  obtain  for  each
country:
Ux,  + UHihx
UY,  + U11hy,
Ux,  + UhhX







S(UY,  +  UhY) FK  (  UUy,+  U  hY.)
(6.0)
(6.1)
where  X, is the shadow price for pollution  and A, =  -UHhE  <  0.
In Walrasian  equilibrium, the right hand side of (6.1)  is zero.  The term  UHhE  takes into
11
P:  1
Assumiaccount  the  effect  of  capital  on  pollution  and  environment  on  utility.  It  is  positive  by
construction  of equation  (3.0)  and (3 1).  Hence,  and not surprisingly, the Walrasian  equilibrium
is not Pareto  optimal.
The first order conditions of P: 1 suggest that while the technical  rate of factor substitution
in the production of Y equals the relative shadow prices,  X 1 and X, of the resource endowments,
this is not the case  for the polluting  sector X:
FL  (6.2)
where  the  rate of substitution  departs  by  the product of the shadow  price  of pollution  and the
marginal physical  product of pollution, XfK..  Result (6.2)  implies that a Pareto optimal outcome
is characterized  by  producers  of X  facing  a shadow  price of input K,  augmented  by  the  social
cost of the effect of pollution  on utility, thus increasing the ratio  L,/Kx relative  to the Walrasian
equilibrium.  As pollution  only depends on the use of K.,  less pollution  is generated, and hence
a higher  environmental  quality  E' is obtained.  The term  XfK.  can  also be used to formulate an
optimal tax on the  input KI,  as a policy  instrument  for the Regulator  in  Section  III.
2.  Optimal Analysis  for the  Case of Global-Disembodied  Pollution
The global-disembodied  pollution problem  is:
P:  2  Max  (x)  U(X,,Y,,h(X,,Y,,E'  - PO" - PO'))
X =  {X,Y,L,K,PO  e  14 I U, =  U(X,,Y,,h(X,,Y,,E"  - PO" - PO')),
12PO" + PO'  =  f(K.") + f(Kx),  ...},
and  other  constraints  listed  in  P:  1.  The difference  between  local  and  global  for  the  optimal
problem  is that pollution  is jointly  produced by  the two  countries,  and hence  requires  a single
constraint equation  for it.  Assuming an  interior solution,  rearranging  the first order  conditions,
and  keeping  track of the country  index i, we obtain:
Ux" + U  hx_  GV  -,  f,  K UX  +UHh,  G x   ;  _____V  (7.0)
UY  + U  h  Fy  K  FK  (UY,  + UHhy)
and similarly  for the  South.  The shadow  price of pollution  now becomes
, =  - UhE,-  'UHshE  < 0.  (7.1)
As pollution affects the global environmental  quality, the shadow price for it is the same for both
countries.  X'  is the shadow price associated  with the South's utility  constraint in  P:2.  Further,
the difference between  (6.0) and (7.0) is that in the global case, the shadow price of pollution has
take  into account the effects  on utility  in both  countries.




However,  as the shadow price  of pollution,  X, in (7.2)  takes into account  the negative  impacts
on both  countries, the ratio L,/Kx relative  to P: 1 increases  more.
133.  Optimal Analysis  for the Case  of Embodied  Pollution
The special feature of embodied pollution is its negative impact on health associated with
the ingestion of X.  Thus,  we redefine  the utility  function  in the embodied  pllution  as follows.
Ui =  U(EX,,Y,).
The  effect of pollution  on health  is included in the  argument,  EX ,. For the trade pattern  noted
in  Section  I,  the maximization  problem  in the embodied  pollution  case is:
P:  3  Max (X) U((1  - pon)X,",Y,)
X =  {X,Y,L,K,po  E I15 I  Us =  U((1  - po)X,"  + (1 - po)X",Y,),
X," + X," = F(L", IK,")
XS  = F(Lx', K, •)
Y,  + Y,  = G(L,,  Ky")  + G(Ly,,  Ky")
po'= g(Kx'/L'),
and  the  endowment  constraints.  The  rearranged  first order  conditions  are  different  from  the
disembodied cases.  For the North,  they  are:
Ux.(1po)  GL  _  - g
Y  FL  FL  UYa
Ux,(I-PO")  G O  _  - K
Uy  FK  FK  UY
The shadow price of the embodied effect  of pollution  in the  North and  South  are:
14n  = - UEXXx -CUp  X'n  <  0
(8.0)
S=  - X  <  0  .
where  UE,,  =  U/a(EiX,), and  'S  is the shadow price associated with the South's utility constraint.
The second term  of X,"  accounts for the marginal  effect of embodied pollution  on utility
in  the South associated  with  exports from the North that  are  consumed in the South,  X,".  The
shadow  price  of  the  embodied  affect  of  pollution  in  the  South  is  only  associated  with
contaminants  from  its own production  X,'.  These  results, of course, indicate that a competitive
equilibrium  is not Pareto  optimal.
The relationship between  factors and  shadow prices  are given by:
½  2  - - ½  (8.1)
F ý  e-  K:gS
Note  the  result that  not only  is  the  denominator  increased  by  the  shadow  price  of embodied
pollution,  but the numerator  is  decreased  by the  shadow price of pollution  since  the  marginal
physical  products of pollution  concentration  are  gL,  < 0 and gK.  > 0.  The policy  implication of
equation  (8.1)  is to induce producers in sector X to use more labor and less capital relative to the
Walrasian  equilibrium.  To  achieve  this objective,  taxing  on K  alone  is not  sufficient  for the
embodied externality.  If the  cost  of labor  is  reduced  by  a  policy,  producers  in  sector  X  are
motivated  to substitute  labor for  capital.  That is the  reason for the consideration  of a  subsidy
policy in  Section III.
The differences  among the first order necessary  conditions for  the types of externalities
15considered  here  suggest that  optimal  environmental  policy  cannot be  the same  for the different
types  of pollution.  For local disembodied pollution,  the shadow price of environmental  quality
in each  country  only  depends on its own marginal utility  (6.1).  As the North has a higher level
of GNP  and  a  lower  level  of environmental  quality,  -X,"  >  -Xe'.  The  shadow  price  for  global
disembodied pollution  (7.1)  is equal across  countries  since  ,,  depends  on the summation of two
countries'  marginal  utility  of environmental  degradation.  For embodied pollution,  the shadow
price in  the exporting country  (the North) depends on the two countries'  marginal  utility,  while
in the South the shadow price only  depends on its own (8.0).  The other mentioned departure is
a subsidy  for  each  unit of labor,  LX,  employed in  the production  of X.
III.  The Regulator's Problem: Internalizing the Externality
1. The  Case  of Local-Disembodied  Pollution
The  Regulator's  problem  of  each  country  is  to  increase  social  welfare  by  inducing
producers of X to subsititute labor for capital.  The analysis of Section II implies that this result
can be accomplished  by an optimal  tax and its form and level are suggested  by (6.2).  The form
can be an emission tax6  or a tax on KI.  As the shadow price is only dependent on each country's
marginal  utility,  the Regulator  can  determine  the tax  policy  unilaterally.  We  first analyze  the
effects  of a tax  on  Kx  for  the  small  country  case  where  world  market prices  are  given.  The
effects of the input tax in this case  are  referred to as the direct  effects.
Given the assumptions  and  structure  developed in Section  I,
6 It is  easily  shown that the Regulator  could instead  choose  an emission tax  and  obtain equivalent results  if
the pollution production function  f(K,) is  linear, i.e.,  PO = a. K,.  In this case, the  advalorem input tax rate  t  on
capital  employed  in the production  of X  is:  t = a  T/r where  T =  - h,  is the emission  tax.
16Proposition  1:  Holding world prices constant, the following conditions holdfor the imposition
of a positive advalorem tax t on K, in either country:
dw  r  dr" - >  0,  <  0,  - <  0,  (9.1) at  at
>0,  <  0,  (9.2)
S  >  0  o0,  >  0.  (9.3)
,  o,  h  o,  (9.4) < 0,  < 0,
aKx  (9.5) <  0,
ME  (9.6) S  0,
•ap  0.  (9.7)
See Section  VI.2  for proof.  The advalorem tax is t = (r* - r)/r, and  byi  is the input i per unit of
output j.  Conditions  (9) indicate  that  a tax on K. affects:  wages  positively,  capital  rental  rate
negatively,  cost of capital  used  in the  polluting  industry  (X)  negatively,  the  production  of Y
positively, X negatively, the capital used per unit of output in both industries positively, the labor
used  per  unit of output  negatively,  the total  K. used  in  the polluting  industry  negatively,  the
environment  E  positively,  and  GNP  which  includes  the  transfer  of  lump  sum  tax  revenue
negatively.  These  results  depend  on  the  factor  intensity  assumption  we  made  in  Section  II.
Alternatively, if we assume instead that the polluting sector X is labor intensive, the signs  in (9)
are  reversed for (9.1),  (9.3)  and (9.4).
Since the relaionship between the demand for goods and pollution is not clear, the direct
17effect on consumer's demand (holding world prices constant) of a K, tax is indeterminate  without
adding more  structure  to  the model.
Proposition 2:  If  the  utility function has a Stone-Geary form,  then,  demand for goods is
independent of the disembodied pollution.  Further, as after tax  GNP falls, demand for both
goods falls.
The demand  functions  derived from  a Stone-Geary  utility are  as follows:
Xi =  C  +  [a/(a+ay)](GNP, - PC - PyD)
Y, = D +  [ay/(a+ay)](GNPi  - xPC  - PyD),
where  C  and D are subsistence  quantity of X and Y,  respectively,  ax  = ca  + (1 - a,  - y)Yx,
ay =  +(l- ax-  o,)yy.  ox,  a)  and  1-aO-c  are  coefficients  for X,  Y  and H in utility  function,  y,
and y,  are coefficients  for X  and Y in health function,  and Yx+  y  <  0.  Obviously,  X and Y  are
both  independtent of E,  and  a falling  in GNP causes demand  for X and Y falls.
It is not surprising that the effects of a Kx tax on the price of X cannot be  signed either.
The  change  in  the price  Px  as one  country's  tax  changes  can  be  derived  by  differentiating  the
world  market  equilibrium condition:
QX(Px,Py,E",t")  + Q,(P,,Py,E',t ) = 0  ,
with  respect to  one country's  t', where  Q,(.)  is the i-th country  excess  demand for X.  Treating
Py  as numeraire,  and  allowing the change  in  E'  to  only depend  on t' yields:
Xi ,  dGnpi   dX i aEi  aXi
OP  - dGnp,  dt'  dE'  dtt'  8t'
at'  aQ.  aQ,
aP,  aP1
18Recall that X, and X' denote demand and supply, respectively.  Since the denominator  is negative
by  the stability conditions  (Samuelson,  1947), aPx/at' has the sign of the numerator.  The supply
effect  is negative  (by  9.2).  Since aX,/8E'  cannot be  signed  in general,  &Px/at'  is indeterminate.
However,  for  a  Stone-Geary  form  of utility,  Proposition  2  implies that  aXi/aE'  =  0.  As  the
demands  for both  goods  fall  and  the supply of Y rises, the  supply  of X  should  fall  more  than
demand,  i.e.,
I  (aX,/aGNP)(oGNPi/t  <I aX'at
Hence  P, rises  in this  case.
The imposition of a tax on K,'  affects  utility through three channels:  change in E',  change
in P,  and the change  in GNP.
Proposition  3:  For the small country disembodied case, an optimal tax on :K'  raises the  i-th
country's utility independently  of the other country's choice  of a tax on Kk.
For given price, the indirect  utility is a function of t.  Differentiating  indirect utility (4.0)
with respect to  t, yields:
dVi  V  GNPi  +  V  aEi
dt  aGNPi  at  aEi  at
We  know  that
aK X
a  d(K)  t  t  , at the optimal tax rate,  since t = (  )/rdK  and  < 0
at  dK x   at  av  aE  dKV  at
aE
In Section  VI.2  we  prove that:  GNP  = tr  . Hence,
at  dt
dV i  _  aV  8K  8K ,   aV  K, V  tr----  tr  =(  - l)tr
dt  aGNP,  at  at  aGNP,  at
19av  dV If  V  < 1,  then  dV  >0  .(10)
8GNP  dt
For example, for  Stone-Geary  preferences,  aV/aGNP  =  (a, +  ay) - x  aa  y  axaP,  - ax  /y(E/GNP)I- a -ay
which  is smaller than  one  as  usually  E/GNP  <  1.  Hence,  (10)  is likely.
When  prices  are  permitted  to  adjust,  the  welfare  of  the  two  countries  is  affected
differentially.  The change  in  utility from  abatement and price adjustment  is obtained by  totally
differentiating  the indirect  utility  function:
dU=(aU/aGNP,)(X-Xi)dP+(aU/aGNdGNP)dGNP,  p+(U/aE')[dEii,  +dEi,  p
Recall  that X'-X,  is positive  (negative)  for the North (South).
Proposition 4:  Given that an increase in P, has a "small" effect on E, i.e., dE'  ivent  is small,
the North (an X-exporting country) is made  better off by  an optimal tax, and the South (an X-
importing country) is made  worse  off if the South's import volume is lager.  The  South is better
off only when  the  trade volume  of X  is  small and the positive change in  the utility from  the
abatement effects is large.
The direct  effects of the tax is
(OU//GNPi)dGNP  i,  p + (aU/aEi)dEi  ivn,,
which  is positive  for an optimal  tax rate by (10).  The sign of (aU/aE')dE' i •,  is negative if P.
rises.  Hence, if this term is small,  dU, is positive for the North.  However,  the term  (X'-Xi)dPx
is negative  for the  South (X-importing  country).  Thus, dU,  <  0, if its excess  demand for  X is
large and dominates  the positive  effect of the policy on its utility.  Only when the trade volume
is small,  and the positive  abatement effects  on  its utility  is  large, can  the South be  made better
off when  P,  rises.
20In  contrast  to  the  analyses  in  Section  II,  if  no  transfer  payments  are  made  among
countries, then a country  (the South  in this case)  can be made worse off when the imposition of
pollution taxes cause the terms of trade to change in favor of the other country.  The South could
be  made  no  worse  off if part  of the  environmental  tax  revenues  collected  in  the  North  are
transferred to  the South.  For this reason the optimal  level of t' is  at least a second best policy.
The level  and direction  of transfers  are  derived  in the numerical  analysis.
The  implications  of these  results,  and  those  in  the  other  two  cases  considered  below,
suggest  that  in  the  absence  of  international  transfers,  a  country  is  unlikely  to  impose
environmental  taxes if the loss in welfare from  changes in the terms of trade  dominate welfare
gains  from  environmental  enhancement.  Countries  that  experience  gains  from environmental
taxes that improve their terms of trade may be encouraged  to over-tax the polluting factors if the
incremental  losses from over-taxing  are smaller than the gains from changes in the terms of trade.
These  results  also  contradict  the  notion  that  a  country's  comparative  advantage  will  be
compromised  by  the adoption  of a pollution  control  policy  in the  sector  for which  it holds a
comparative  advantage.
2.  The Case  of Global-Disembodied  Pollution
Proposition  1, 2,  and 4 of III. 1 still  hold, while Proposition 2 has to be revised since,  for
the global-disembodied  pollution, intervention  in one country  affects the other country's welfare
directly.
We can use a one shot Nash game to characterize the interdependence of regulator choices
on the other country.  A strategy for each country's  regulator is to abate  pollution  using the tax
suggested  by problem  P:  2.  Hence, using equation  (4.0), utility  for each  country  is:
21U, =  V, (GNP,(t'  ),E(t,ts)) =  V,(t,ts).
Proposition  5:  For the small country case, if pollution is global, then the Nash equilibrium, if
one exists, will not necessarily lead to a Pareto  Superior outcome without cooperation between
regulators of the two countries.
Given  world price  Px, the changes  in  social  welfares  of the non-cooperative  regulator's
behavior  can  be represented  in  a Nash table:
North
South  No pollution  abatement  With  pollution  abatement
(t=0,  tn=0 )  :  >(t  =0o,  ta  > o)  -
No  pollution  dU,=O;  dU=0)}  dUs  - av   E dta
abatement 
E  ata
v 8   a 8GNP  a8v  aE dU  aV  GNPdt"  + _.  dt
dGNP  at"  BE  atP
(tf  > 0,  t=  = 0)  (t'> 0,  t  >0) -
With pollution  dUO - V,  oGNP,  dt  V.  B,  dt.  d  d  +  (t'  d  a.E at
abatement  aGNP  at  aE at  at
aVt  0NP,  V.  dE  aE av  aE  dU.  dt'+a  -(-dt'  +--dt
dU  =  --  dt  '  GNP  dt  aE  at'  at"
aE  at
If  I  (aV,/aGNP)(aGNP/&t 1) I  > (8V/aE)(aE/at'), for the i-th  country,  (12)
then,  t' =  0 is a rational  choice  for the i-th country's regulator.  If  (12)  holds for both countries,
then, t" = 0, t  = 0  are  chosen. Thus, the Nash  equilibrium  is the status  quo.  Only if (12)  does
not hold for both  countries,  would t " >  0, t  > 0 be chosen,  and Nash solution  is Pareto optimal.
Similar to the local-disembodied  case, when world  market prices  are allowed  to change,
22the North (South) experiences  an improvement (deterioration)  in its terms of trade thus increasing
dU, and decreasing  dU, for any strategy  except the status quo.  This  increases incentives for the
North to choose t" > 0 and for the  South to  choose ts  =  0.  An example in Section  IV shows  that
it might be  a Nash  equilibrium  in the large country  case.
3.  The Case  of  Embodied Pollution
There are two distinguishing properties of the embodied case.  First, equation (8.1)  implies
that  the Regulator needs  to tax  KY  and  to  subsidize L,.  Thus producers  pay  w(1-s) for  Lx  and
r(1+t) for K, where  s = X,'gL/w  and t = -•'gK./r.  Second,  for the X-exporting  country  (North),
its shadow price of pollution  X,  depends  on both countries'  marginal utilities of environmental
quality since the pollutants are contained in the tradable good X (8.0).  Based on these properties,
only  Proposition  1 holds  for the embodied  case.  For Proposition  2,  demand  for  goods are  not
independent of pollution.
Proposition 6:  For a Stone-Geary form  utility function, demands for both goods are  not
independent of pollution if  pollution is embodied in X.  Further,  ifX is a necessary good, demand
for it rises with a higher level  of pollution  concentration, while  if X  is a luxury good, demand
for it can fall if the level of concentration is high.
The  demand  functions  derived  from  the  Stone-Geary  utility  in  the  case  of embodied
pollution  are  as follows:
Xi = C/E, + a(GNP,  - PxC/E i - PyD)/PX
Y, = D + (1-a)(GNP,  - PC/Ei - PyD)/P,.
If C  is  positive,  then  8X/8E  <  0,  i.e.,  demand  for  X  falls  as  X  has  less  contaminants.  An
example  is the need to consume  a large quantity of low quality  - impure  food to obtain a given
23nutrition level.  If C is negative,  8X/8E  > 0, i.e.,  demand  for X rises  as X is cleaner.  Proposition
6 depends on the functional  form of utility  we chose.  If utility were of the Cobb-Douglas form,
then  the  demand  for goods  is independent  of E.
Proposition  7:  If the South (an X-importing country) does not have an abatement policy, then
reducing embodied pollution in the North can reduce the excess demand  for X in the South if X
is a necessary good.
This  is  a  straightforward  result  of Proposition  6.  As  the  pollution  embodied  in  the
imported  X is reduced, then, the demand for X falls in the South.  However,  as the South  does
not  intervene,  its supply  does not change.  Hence,  the decline  in its demand  for X only causes
its import  demand to  fall.  The result of Proposition  7 depends  on the sign of C.  If X  is akin to
luxury  good  (C  negative),  then  the import demand for  X  rises  as pollution  falls.
Proposition 8:  For  a small country, an advalorem subsidy s on L  affects w,  r, X',  Y,  the input
ratio K/L, and the intensity of pollution, po,  in the opposite directions to the effects of a tax on
K,, with an exception of the effect on GNP, which is negative for both.
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition  1 in Section VI.2.  It can  also be shown
that  because  the  effects  of s  are  opposite  to  those  of t,  their joint  effects  on  L,  and  Kx  are
indeterminate.
Proposition  9:  Given that X is K intensive, only when the concentration  of pollution is reduced
by taxing K, and subsidizing L,  can the social welfare for each country be improved; if t  >  0
and s  =  0, the concentration of pollution (po) rises.
The tax effect on the input ratio Kx/L.  can be derived from Proposition  1, (9.3)  and (9.4).
Since  Kx/Lx  = b,/bL,  (9.3)  and  (9.4)  imply  8(Kx/Lx)/9t  > 0.  From  the  concentration  function,
24apo/a(K,/LJ  > 0.  Hence,  Spo/8t  > 0,  which  completes  the  proof of the  second  part  of the
Proposition.  Holding  output prices  constant,  the change  in  utility in  the embodied case has  the
form:
Vi   . Gnpi  Gnpi  aV i   E i   aE
dVi  • dt 1   +  ds' +  (--t  I +  -ds i )
aGnp,  ati  8s i   Ei  t  at  si
By Propositions  1 and 8, cGNP/at' <  0, and aGNP/as'  < 0.  With  s' = 0,  dU, < 0 as apo'/It > 0.
From Proposition  8, 8E1/s'  > 0.  Hence,  dUi >  0,  when the positive effect of aE,/s' dominates
the  negative  effects of  Ei,/at' and cGNP,/at  plus aGNP,/s'.
Proposition 10:  In the small country case, the South (who imports the polluting good) benefits
from the unilateral  action of the North.
The Stone-Geary  indirect  utility  in the  embodied case  is
U, =  aa(1-a)-aP-BP•  1 -')E  a (GNPi  - PxC/Ei - PyD).
If the North adopts an unilateral abatment policy, the South's utility would change as pon changes,
i.e.,
UI/apo" =  (8E,/apo")[aU, + a(l-a)•rPl'.aCEa-l](l/E,)  < 0, as aE,/Cpon  < 0.
Hence, a lower level of po" rises utility in the South.  However,  an unilateral  action  in the South
cannot benefit the North as the  South  is an X-importing  country.
In  the  large  country  case,  the  world  price  is  re-equilibrated  following  a  country's
imposition of an abatement policy.  Proposition  1 and 8 imply that if any country  (or both) tax
KI only, then  the total supply of X falls and Y rises, and  P, might rise.  Further, if any  country
(or  both)  subsidize  L.  only,  then  the  total  supply  of X  rises  and  Y  falls,  and  P.  might  fall.
25However,  the joint effects of a tax on KX and a subsidy on L,  are  indeterminate.  The numerical
example in  Section  IV  is used  to  show the  nature of this relationship.
IV.  An  Example  Economy
Functional  forms  and  parameters  of production  and  pollution  technologies,  and  utility
functions  assumed  are  as follows.
1. Function  forms and parameters assumed
Consistent  with the structure  presented  in  Section  I, the following  is assumed.
a.  Production  technology  and  endowments
X  = Lx 0 25 s
0 7  ,  Y  = Ly075
025
L  =L' =  10  ,  K  =  18  ,  K= 12.
b.  Pollution
Local-disembodied:  PO'  = 0.07(Kxi)09.
Global-disembodied:  PO = 0.07[(Kx")
0 9  +  (KS)
0.9].
Embodied:  po' = 0.02(K,'/L).
c. Utility
U, =  (Xi  - 1)0  (Y  - 1)02  (H, - 0.2)°6.
Health production  function
H =  (Xi  - 1)025  (Yi  - 1)065  o01
where, E =  {4.5-PO',  4.5-POn-POS} for the local and global-disembodied  cases, respectively.  In
the  embodied case,  as the health  effects of pollution  cannot be separated  from  the consumption
of X,  the utility  functions  are defined  as follows:
U,  = [(1-po)X," - 1]0 4 (Y,  - 1)06
26Us  =  [(1-po")Xs  +  (1-poS)X,  -1] 0 4  (Y,  - 1)
0 6.
2.  The empirical analysis
Eight equilibria are  calculated  for each  of the disembodied and embodied cases:
P.O:  Pareto  optimal  solution,  as depicted  in  Section  II,
WE:  Walrasian  equilibrium  with no tax
RSB:  both  countries  tax, world prices  fixed
RWB:  both  countries tax, world prices adjust
RSN:  unilateral  action:  only the North taxes,  world prices fixed
RSS:  unilateral  action:  only  the South taxes,  world prices fixed
RWN:  unilateral  action:  only the North taxes,  world prices adjust
RWS:  unilateral  action:  only the  South taxes,  world prices  adjust.
All  solutions R-.  utilized the Regulator's optimal  tax rate on  Kx  and for embodied case,
R-* includes  a subsidy  on  LX.  The  results are presented  in the  Section  VI.1  where  the various
solutions  are reported relative  to the Walrasian equilibrium,  WE.  For brevity, we largely  focus
on those results that  are noted as being indeterminate  in the analytical  analyses.
2.1  The  local-disembodied  case.
Tables  1 and  2  report  the  results  for  the  North  and  South,  respectively.  The  RSB
(Column 2) results support the predictions of Proposition  1 - 3.  Proposition 4 is shown by RWB,
Column 3.  Column 1, Table 1 and 2 shows that the Pareto optimal solution results in an increase
in the consumption  of the Y and H, and  a fall in the consumption  of X, pollution  PO  falls and
utility  rises  in  the  North  with  the  constraint,  requiring  that the  South be  made  no  worse  off,
binding.  The Regulator's  advalorem tax t on K,  equals  about 1.44 % in the wealthier  North  and
27about  1.18  % in the  South.  Holding  prices  fixed, the consumption  of both  X  and Y are  slightly
smaller than  for  the WE  case, pollution  falls and  welfare  rises (column  2,  both tables).
When  both  countries  tax and  world prices  adjust (column  3), the  price of P.  rises.  But
the supply of X still falls  and Y rises 1 1 both countries relative to WE, and hence, pollution  falls.
fne levels  of supplies,  pollution  and  input  ratio  Kx/L  in  both  countries  are  identical  to  those
obtained  in the Pareto optimal  solution.  The direction of change  in consumer demand is also the
same  as in  P.O.  However,  as Px increases,  the North's comparative  advantage in the production
of X  causes its GNP to rise relative  to the South.  This causes  the demand  for X to fall  less and
for Y to rise more  in the North than  in the South.  Thus, the consumption  level of health in the
South  falls  while  it  rises  in  the  North  relative  to  P.O.  In  this case,  the  South's  welfare  falls
because  the terms  of trade  effects  dominate  the  welfare  increasing  effects of the pollution  tax.
We  study  the transfer needed to  make the South  no worse off in  a later Section.
The contrast between  unilateral action with world prices fixed (RSN and S,  column 4 and
5) and unilateral  action with world prices  equilibrating  (RWN  and S, column  6 and  7) provides
insights  into terms of trade  effects. Since  pollution  is local,  when  only the North taxes  at fixed
world prices, the solution is identical to RSB, column  2, where both countries tax at fixed world
prices,  and  likewise  for  the  South.  This  substantiates  the  analytical  results  that,  for  a  small
country,  unilateral  and  bilateral  actions  are  equivalent.  When  prices adjust,  the  welfare of the
South always falls whether or not it imposes a pollution tax.  If the South does not tax, the terms
of trade  effects on  the North  are  smaller  than  when  both tax.  When  only  the  South taxes  and
prices adjust, supply of X  in the North rises and pollution rises  relative to the WE.  Further,  the
South experiences  the smallest negative terms of trade  effects  which  are  not dominated by  the
28welfare  increasing  effects of lower pollution.
2.2  The  global-disembodied  case
Results for this case are  reported in Table 3 and 4. The direction of changes found in the
Pareto  optimal  solution  (column  1) are  similar  to  the  local-disembodied case.  When  both
countries tax  Kx,  whether  prices  are fixed or  adjust, the  direction and  causes  of changes  in  the
variables  listed  in the Tables  are similar  to  the local-disembodied case  (columns  2  and  3).  As
pollution  is global,  the effects of unilateral  action differ from  the local  case (Columns 4 and  5).
For the  small  country  (prices  fixed),  unilateral  action  to  tax KI, yields  benefits  to  the  other
country  from  the  reduction  in  pollution  that  exceed  the  benefits  of  the  taxing  country.
Consequently,  as  mentioned  in  the  analytical  model,  taking  no  action  permits  a  country  (or
region) to free ride on the other's pollution control  policy.  When  world prices adjust, this result
is dramatically  changed.  Changes  in  the terms of trade make the South  worse off when  either
it  acts  unilaterally, or  when the North  acts unilaterally  to tax KI.  When  both tax, the South is
made even worse off while the North experiences  its largest gain in welfare.  Table 10 shows that
the Nash  solution  is for the North  to tax  and the South not to tax.  To  obtain a Pareto optimal
outcome (where both countries tax), a transfer from North to South is required.  However,  it can
be shown that  such a transfer reduces  the welfare  gain of the North to a level that is below the
gain it would experience  in  the Nash  equilibrium.
2.3  The  embodied  pollution  case
Results for this case  are  reported  in Tables  5 and  6.  The directions of changes found  in
the Pareto optimal solution are different from the disembodied cases.  The supply of X rises and
Y falls in the North.  As the  concentration  level of pollution  embodied  in  X falls, the demand
29for  a  healthier  X  rises  and  Y  falls  in  both  countries.  Utility  rises  in  the  South  while  the
constraint requiring  the  North be  made no worse  off is binding.
For the  small  country  case (column  2), when both countries take action  (i.e.,  they  tax Kx
and subsidize L.), the supply of X increases  and Y falls in both countries.  As the change in GNP
is negative,  demand for both goods fall, but the decline in demand for X is larger.  Hence,  utility
increases  in both  countries.
In  contrast  to  the  disembodied cases,  when  world  prices  adjust,  the  price  of  Px  falls,
column  3.  Effectively,  the  labor  subsidy  effect  on  supply  of X  in  the  North  dominates  the
negative  effects of the  KX  tax and the falling in  Px,  and hence  its supply of X  rises and Y falls.
However in  the South,  changes  in the supplies of both goods  are  in the opposite  direction.  As
GNP  falls  less  than  the  decline  in  P,,  demand  for  X  rises  and  falls for  Y  in  both  countries.
Utility  increases  in  both  countries,  and  increases  more  in  the  South,  which  implies  that
environmental  effect dominates the terms of trade effect,  a rare phenomenon  in  our simulation.
For  the  embodied case,  we  also  examine  the  effects  where  both  countries  impose  the
previously  determined  optimal tax  on Kx  only:
RSK:  both  countries tax K.,  world prices  fixed
RWK:  both countries  tax K,  world prices adjust
The results are  reported in Table  5 and  6, column  4 - 5.  We observe that for the small country,
if only  the pollution  input K,  is taxed,  the pollution  concentration  per unit of X rises since  the
input ratio  Kx/Lx  rises (column  4).  The ratio  rises because  X  is K intensive and  tax causes the
rental  rate r to  fall  more than the effect  of the advalorem  tax (see Proposition  1).  The welfare
in both countries fall, and shown in  Proposition 9.  This is an important counter-intuitive  result.
30It suggests  that,  in  the embodied case,  and for  a  small  country,  taxing the  pollution  input only
(no  labor  subsidy)  may  cause  the  tax  inclusive  price  of this  input to  fall,  thus  increasing  the
concentration  of pollution  per  unit of  X,  and  decreasing  utility!  For the  large  country,  only
taxing K,  causes P,  to  rise (column 5) and pollution  concentration  to  fall, as a rise  in P,  causes
(l+t)r/w to rise and hence  Kx/L. to fall.  The terms of trade effect makes the North better off and
the  South worse off in this situation.
2.4  Trade effects
As mentioned,  the total  effects of input taxes on trade  are analytically  indeterminate  as
well.  Simulation  results  of these  effects  are  reported  in  Table  7.  Exclusive  of output  price
changes,  i.e.,  the small  country case, optimal taxes cause the North's exports of X to fall and the
South's export of Y to rise in both disembodied cases, while exports of X rise and Y fall  for the
North  and  South,  respectively,  in  the  embodied case.  After  output  prices  are  permitted  to
re-equilibrate,  the North's exports of X rise for the global-disembodied and embodied cases,  but
fall  for the local-disembodied  case.  The South's  exports of Y rise in all  three types of pollution.
Thus,  when world prices re-equilabrate,  countrys' comparative  advantage is not reduced  for the
cases  of  global-disembodied  and  embodied  types  of  pollution.  Only  for  the  case  of
local-disembodied pollution  is that North's comparative  advantage  in  X decreased.
2.5  Transfer effects
If the  welfare  effects  caused  by  the  change  in the terms  of trade  dominate  the  effects
caused  by  environmental  policy,  so  that  one  country  is  made  worse  off, then  compensatory
payments from the gainer to the looser might be considered.  We simulate  such scenarios for the
disembodied cases, where the North transfers tax revenue  to the South at a level that leaves the
31South  no  worse  off than before the imposition  of taxes.  These  results are  reported  in Table  8.
Based on the optimal  tax rates,  the South's total tax revenue  is 0.23%  and 0.61%  of GNP
for the local  and global disembodied,  respectively.  Correspondingly,  for the North, revenues are:
0.5%  and 0.99% of GNP.  The amounts  of revenue that  have  to be  transferred  from  the North
to the  South so that the South  is made no worse off are only  10.25%  and  10.87% of the North's
total tax revenues for the local and global  cases, respectively.  These amounts are only equivalent
to  0.05%  and  0.11%,  respectively,  of the  North's  GNP.  The corresponding  change  in  welfare
levels are reported  in Table  9. Note that  after the transfers, the Pareto optimal  levels of welfare
reported  above are  obtained.  Hence,  these results  indicate  that the optimal  tax rates  are  second
best policies  for both countries.
V.  Conclusions
The effects of environment on trade and social welfare  are analyzed in a modified general
equilibrium  Heckscher-Ohlin  framework  where  health  appears  as  an  argument  in  a  quasi-
homothetic  utility function.  This form of the function is used to capture the notion that the North
is  willing  to  spend  more  to  alleviate  environmental  effects  on  health  than  the  South.
Environmental  effects  on  health  and  welfare  depend  on  three  types  of pollution  which  we
characterize  as local-disembodied, global-disembodied  and embodied.  Pollution  is produced  by
an  input as  a by-product  of production.  The results  show that  an optimal tax  can, in principle,
improve each country's welfare if the country is small in the world market.  however,  for a large
country  or region, changes  in the terms of trade  may cause  one country  to be made better off at
the  expense  of the other.  Then,  a Pareto  improvement  can  only  be reached  by an  optimal  tax
with  compensation,  which  suggests  that  some form of compensatory  payment may  be  required
32to  encounrage  the  other  country  to  pursue  abatement  policies.  We  explore  the  strategic
interdependence  that  arises  in  the  case  of global-disembodied pollution.  Characterizing  the
interdependence  as a one-shot Nash game, we find that Nash equilbrium is not necessary a Pareto
optimal.  Under  cooperative  behavior,  both  countries  can  improve  their  welfare  by  jointly
imposing a pollution  control tax with  a necessary  compensatory  transfer.
For the  case  of embodied pollution,  the optimal  tax for  the exporting  country  not only
depends on its own marginal welfare loss of pollution on health, but also on the loss the country's
exports  cause  on  consumers  in  the  importing  country.  Further,  if only  the polluting  input  is
taxed, then its after tax rental rate falls if this input is intensively used.  Hence the effectiveness
of this instrument to  lower  the embodied pollutants  is  limited and  even  is negative.  Instead,  a
tax on  the polluting  input in  combination  with  a subisdy to the non-polluting  input can  reduce
pollution and improve  country's  welfare if the country  is small  in the world  market.
No  matter pollution  is  local  or  global,  disembodied  or  embodied,  an  abatement  policy
adopted  by both  countries or by  one country  unilaterally  would not necessarily  hurt a country's
comparative advantage in both small and large country  cases, i.e.,  reduce its exports of polluting
good.
33VI. Appendix
1. Simulation  Results for the Example  Economy


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table  6: Embodied,  South
P.O/WE  RSB/WE  RWB/WE  RSK/WE  RWK/WE
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
X'  0.979589  1.109601  0.979589  0.875360  0.967025
Y'  1.006490  0.949718  1.006490  1.051704  1.013840
X,  1.022694  0.994480  1.021159  0.999554  0.980338
Y,  0.993109  0.999697  0.991099  0.998599  1.007157
U,  1.016235  1.011136  1.013744  0.996407  0.996874
po  0  0.833744  0.760929  0.771228  1.039937  0.973371
s'  0.1232
t"  0.0273
r/w  0.994793  0.908122  0.889158  0.953698
r7'/w  1.475209  1.343519  0.975253  1.041255
Px/Py  1.0  0.960210  1.0  1.032631
GNP,  0.997562  0.986773  0.998890  1.009273
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0.973371Talbe  7: The changes  in  the excess  supplies  after tax
Local disembodied  Global disembodied  Embodied
Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large
country  country  country  country  country  country
Excess  supply  of X  -0.06148  -0.00263  -0.12554  +0.01146  +0.6428  +0.1344
(North)
Excess  supply of Y  +0.05028  +0.00311  +0.13566  +0.02486  -0.3190  +0.0892
(South)
Table  8:  Tax revenue,  transfer  and  its percentages  in GNP
SOUTH  NORTH
Local-  Global-  Local-  Global-
Total tax revenue  0.0255  0.0664  0.0646  0.1294
(Tax revenue/GNP)  %  0.2340  0.6067  0.4958  0.9894
Total transfer  0.0066  0.0141
(Transfer/Tax  revenue)%  10.2449  10.8651
(Transfer/GNP)%  0.0606  0.1285  0.0508  0.1075
Table  9:  Comparisons  of the  utility levels before  and  after transfer
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SOUTH  NORTH
Local-  Global-  Embodied  Local-  Global-  Embodied
No  tax  5.153  5.093  4.6289  6.24399  6.205  5.6486
Tax without  5.149  5.085  4.630  6.248  6.214  5.647
transfer
Tax with  transfer  5.153  5.093  4.6292  6.24426  6.206  5.6486
Pareto  optimal  5.153  5.093  4.6289  6.24426  6.206  5.6489Table  10:  Nash equilibrium,  large  country case
NORTH  NO TAX  TAX
SOUTH
NO TAX  dU, =  0;  dU,  = -0.701;
dU  = 0  dU,  =  0.621
TAX  dU,  = -0.897;  dU, =  -1.536;
dU  = 0.840;  dU  =  1.481;
where  {t,  = 0,  t,  >  0}  is  Nash  equilbrium.
2.  Proof of  Proposition  1 and 5
a. Background
Following  the traditional  model  (e.g.,  Woodland,  1982), given  factor endowments  and  output
prices, the min-unit-cost  function for each sector  is equal  to the output price of this sector, i.e.,
c,(w,r)  = Px
c  (w, r)  = Py
The  factor market clearing  equations  are
acx i x  +  yi  .L,
dw  8w
8c  -
c3  X'X  +  Yi  K,i
Fr  ar
b. Proof of condition  (9.1)  for the signs of  cw/&t  and cr/ft
Differentiating min-unit-cost  functions  with respect  to t,  holding output prices  constant, yields
38cx  8cw  C3C r +(l+t)
aw  at  ar* at
,cy  aw  +  y ar_
ww  3t  3r  at
ac x +r  0
8r*
where r'=(l+t)r.  In the matrix  form,  we obtain:
8w
bx  (1 +t)b  I  -bkr
b  by8r  0
at
w  1>0
at  A  > °
8r
a t b  bb  r <  0
where A,  =bib  - (1  +t)bibl,,
(  w  T  Br  Br* w*y  yr'  axr*
c. Proof of condition  (13.1)  for the signs  of  wl/8s  and  8r/s
aw  1 b b1  w  w<0
as  Al 8  =  lb  1  biw >o
3  s  Al









= z(  by bt, -(1  +t)  b) <  0.
-b bb  = b.  O  b((1-s)d. Proof of condition  (9.1)  for the  sign of cr'/es
dr  +  r -(l+t)  + r.
at*  at
(A2.0)
Substituting (Al)  into (A2.0)  for tr/et, yields
Br*  1 =   b  b*1  r* +Ar
aKt  A1 C3
(1  r  L  *  +  +Air)
=  bkr<O 1 I
(A2.1)
Since dw/pt, dr/ct and c)wv/Is,  Br/s have opposite signs, we only prove the signs of  XX/at,  Y/@t, cbl/ct,
ab1 /et,  and  cKC/&t.
e. Proof of conditions  (9.3)  and (9.4) for the signs  of  bdbt,  cb 1/at,  ab&  ,ty  and 6bJt
db,  _ abL dw
at  aw  at






The unit cost function cx(wr)  is quasi  concave  and homogenous  of degree  one  in (w,rj)  e  R2,. Hence
b,=-cx/?r" and bx=?cx/c.w  are homogenous of degree zero in (wr)  e R2





+  r  = 0.
dr*
Since  cx(w,r")  is  quasi  concave,  cbl/r"  <  0.  Thus  bk/cv  >  0.  Combined  the results  of  (Al)  and
(A2.1),  we get
ab,  =  b  aw  bab  ar* ab  ab  aw+  >0
at  aw  at  ar*  at
(+) (+)  (-)  (-)
By the same  method, we  get
ab.  ba  baw  +  b  r*  0
+  <0
at  8w  at  ar* at
(-)and  similar  for  and  (-)
and similar for  cbky/0t  and  yb,/8t
a t  o  t  0.
adt  at A
f. Proof of (9.2)  for the signs  of a8X8t and aY/8t
Differentiating factor market clearing  conditions  with respect to t, holding endowments  constant,
yields
41Sax  aY  abL
b-  +•  bl  + (-  a  + aBt  aBt  w
8b,  aw  abar,*  aba  r a  Y)  +  X  +  Ž2kY  = 0
aw  at  ar* at  ar  at
8X  aY  a,  a  aw  ab~ar  abar i a  Y  +bY  •+(  X+  Y)+  X+  Y  = 0
S  at  8aw  aw  at  ar*  at  ar at
In the  matrix form,  we  have
0X
b,  bh- at











a  bb  ar*  abd  y  dr  Y +  X  +  Y
ar*  at  ar  at
+rb  at  ar  at ar*  at  ar  at
Substituting  (Al) and  (A2)  in the  above for  cw/t and  r'/8t:
bkyX(  bk  -bht) ++bY(bly  -by 8w  a  kCW  C
Hence,
ax
S_ rdt  bk
Y  AiA 2 ,  -bL
Bt
-Y-)+bY(b  -
(-) (-)  (-)
8r  w,
(+) (+)  (+)
42where  A2  = bb  - bb  = blybh(
axt  y
Thus,  - <0 ,  - >0.
&t  &
- ) < 0.
U
*
g.  Proof of condition  (9.5) for the sign  of 8K• 8t
+ X  k  + Xabk.
aw  at  &* a
where  X  '   +X  a
8w  at  a&*
Xr  h  K  b  )  aK  bb
dr
r (b  k  b  k)[b  ,Y&  h  +b  -b tL  )1 A-  Y,  L  L  CD-b  Y  N(\1W  )&
b"b
-b  [X(Y o  --  ,) +  bY(  -t4  )] r  *  w  81
adding  (A3.1)  with (A32),  yields
8K 1
*- 1 W 2 )^  - )1
(-)  (-) (-)  (-)
-bY  -N  ) -kX  &X)8 < 0r





K  ax  ab,  ax
ky- C- + X  - T- ati  at  a aAs  E =  E" - f(K.),  @KI/et  <  0 implies OE/t >  0.
h. Proof of  condition  (9.7)  for the sign  of cGnp/ct
We proceed  by  showing that the summation of the first four terms of following equation  is zero:
np  w  &  &  K =L  + K-  + rK  + tK  + tr at  at  at  at  dt
Substituting 8w/&,  4r/9t of (Al) into the above, we obtain for the  first two terms
Lf +  p  A  NbkxL  - kE K) =  -r
Substituting  for L,K,  we  obtain
rbk, = - Atc  X  +  bY) - bbkX +  bY)]
- -rKx)
h  e  aw  r  ar Then,  L-  + K-  + rKx  + tKx- at  at  at
A2  1 = rK(l-  +t tbb  )
1
=  --rKxbxb  - (1 +  t)bb  - bbk  + bbl  +  tblyb]
=0
dGnp  dGnp  -dw  - r  Or  Kx Tus,  =  - L-  +  K-  +  r  rK-  +  tr- t  at  at  at  at  dt
8  ,Kx  a8 =  tr  0,  as  - <-0.  U
81  81
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